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RECENT CASES
The present decision demonstrates even more conclusive-
ly than previous cases the wide scope which the legislatures
have in regulating economic matters. So far as due process
is concerned, the field is entirely clear for the lower federal
courts to uphold any and all economic regulatory statutes.
It would seem advisable and entirely proper for them to do
exactly that. If the elusive limit of legislative power in this
area exists at all, it is known only to the Supreme Court.
Unless and until the Court gives substance, in the form of
decided cases, to the theory that a limit exists, the lower
federal courts may very well operate upon the assumption




NECESSITY OF DELIVERY OF MEMORANDUM
Gall filed a complaint relying on an agreement by the
Brashiers to lease certain Oklahoma oil land to him for five
years. He alleged that the Brashiers were to complete the
oil and gas lease on a form furnished by him and to forward
the lease to a bank with draft attached for the lease price,
payable at a specified date. The Brashiers filled out the
lease in the office of their attorney, but the following day
40. So far as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is concerned, the same observation applies with equal force to state
courts. But state courts of a mind to invalidate economic regulation
have held that the due process clause (or some other provision) of
their respective state constitutions places a greater limitation upon
legislative power than does the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare
Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N. W.2d 507 (1943), and State Board
of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N. E.2d (1942), with
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S: 236 (1941), and Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502 (1934). Compare Illinois C. R. R. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm., 387 Ill. 256, 56 N. E.2d 432 (1944), with Federal Power Comm.
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942). Compare Cincinnati
v. Correll, 141 Ohio 535, 49 N. E.2d 412 (1943), with West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). See also the recent case of Kirt-
ley v. State, 84 N. E.2d 712 (Ind. 1949), discussed note 8 supra.
In view of the holdings of the state courts in the cases compared
above, it is possible that the petitioning insurance company in the
present case may yet prevail if it should choose to carry its fight to
the state courts. Montana and Kentucky have declared similar statutes
unconstitutional under their state constitutions. Montana v. Gateway
Mortuaries, 87 Mont. 225, 287 Pac. 156 (1930); Kenton & Campbell
Benevolent Burial Association v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233, 200 S. W.2d
120 (1946). And the issue of constitutionality under the state consti-
tution is clearly not res judicata. Boomer v. Olsen, supra.
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they instructed him not to deliver it to the bank and nego-
tiated for a lease with another party. Gall sued without delay
for specific performance of the contract, and the case was
removed to the federal district court in Oklahoma. That
court sustained the Brashiers' motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Oklahoma Statute of Frauds' had not been satisfied
since the lease instrument, without being delivered, could not
be a memorandum within the requirements of the statute.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, 2 hold-
ing that the undelivered lease could be a satisfactory memor-
andum.3  Gall v. Brashier, 169 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1948).
Neither the original Statute of Frauds nor its modern
American counterparts mention delivery of the memorandum
as necessary to its effectiveness. 4 Thus, whether delivery is
requisite depends not upon construction of specific statutory
terminology but upon the necessity of importing into the
statute some element without which the legislative purpose
must fail. It has been said that the object and meaning of
the statute is to "reduce contracts to a certainty in order to
avoid perjury on the one hand and fraud on the other."5 The
problem is whether delivery of the memorandum containing
the evidence of the agreement is indispensable to fulfilling
that object.
1. The Statute of Frauds stipulates that contracts for lease for
longer than one year are "invalid" unless some note or memorandum
of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged.
OKLA. STAT., tit. 15, § 136 (1941).
2. It was assumed by the Court of Appeals that the motion to dis-
miss put in issue the sufficiency of the undelivered lease to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. There was a dissent on the ground that a
motion to dismiss should be sustained when the complaint in an action
for specific performance of a contract names certain defendants, and
not al of them have signed the memorandum offered to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. This problem is not treated here.
3. The federal court concluded that the Oklahoma courts would not
require delivery of the memorandum, because the Oklahoma cases of
Hopkins v. Walker, 144 Okla. 254, 291 Pac. 70 (1929); Schuerer v.
Crockett, 108 Okla. 218, 236 Pac. 30 (1925); Akers v. Brooks, 103
Okla. 98, 229 Pac. 544 (1924) had cited with approval the Kansas case
of Arnett v. Wescott, 107 Kan. 693, 193 Pac. 377 (1920) and the
Alabama case of Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345 (1880) which held
undelivered deeds to be effective as memoranda. The analogy to these
cases seems to be quite proper since an oil and gas lease has often
been held to be in the nature of a conveyance of an interest in land.
Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 532, 77 N. E. 368 (1906); 2 SUMERS,
OIL AND GAS § 227 (1938).
4. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 33-101; see 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 579A (rev. ed. 1936).
5. Note, 11 BOSTON L. REV. 440 (1931); see Drury v. Young, 58
Md. 546, 551 (1882),
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Although the problem has at best been one productive
of diverse views,6 some of the confusion in the area has
arisen from failure to recognize the questions decided by
the cases. Often cited for the proposition that delivery is
necessary are cases which never reached that issue but de-
cided simply that the instruments in question were insuffi-
ciently complete to constitute memoranda.7 A second group
of cases, usually involving instruments purporting to convey
interests in land, turns on the question whether there was a
contract at all, and relies upon lack of delivery as evidence
that no agreement had been reached.8 In still other cases
the courts have become so intent upon the necessity of de-
livery of a deed to pass title that they have failed to consider
whether the undelivered deed might nevertheless serve as a
memorandum of a contract to convey.9
In deciding that delivery of the memorandum was un-
necessary the court in the Gall case reasoned that the evil of
oral evidence to prove a contract is sufficiently guarded
against by the production of the writing, whoever may have
had custody of it.'1 If it be admitted that the memorandum
6. In the Gall case it is admitted that the majority view requires
delivery; many authorities believe this to be the majority view. See
e.g., Harris v. Dacus, 209 Ark. 1031, 193 S. W.2d 1006 (1946); Sursa
v. Cash, 171 Mo. App. 396, 156 S. W. 779 (1913); Weir v. Batdorf,
24 Neb. 83, 38 N. W. 22 (1888); 2 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 579A (rev.
ed. 1936); 1 REED, STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 388 (1884); Note, 100 A. L.
R. 196 (1934). One editor takes the position that in cases where the
undelivered writing is not a deed or lease the majority view does not
require delivery. Note, 145 A. L. R. 1024 (1943). There is consider-
able authority for this position. E.g., Alpha Phi of Sigma Kappa v.
Kincaid, 180 Ore. 568, 178 P.2d 156 (1947); Allen v. Mowry, 278 Pa.
64, 122 Atl. 168 (1923).
7. Louther v. Potter, 197 Fed. 196 (E. D. Ky. 1912); Holland v.
McCarthy, 173 Cal. 597, 160 Pac. 1069 (1916); Johnson v. Wallden,
342 Ill. 201, 173 N. E. 790 (1930); Nugent v. Humpich, 231 Ky. 122,
21 S. W.2d 153 (1929); Carr v. Mazon Estate, 26 N. M. 308, 191 Pac.
137 (1920); Axe v. Potts, 349 Pa. 345, 37 A.2d 572 (1944). This
problem of sufficiency of the memorandum as an integrated expression
of a prior oral agreement should be carefully distinguished from the
problem of necessity for delivery of an otherwise sufficient memor-
andum. If a contract has been found to be unenforceable because the
memorandum was incomplete, the fact that the writing in that case was
undelivered does not mean that the case is authority for the proposition
that an undelivered writing complete in terms would also be ineffective.
8. Steel v. Fife, 48 Iowa 99 (1878); Johnson v. Brooks, 31 Miss.
17 (1856); see Note, 20 TENN. L. REv. 201 (1948).
9. Pulse v. Miller, 81 Ind. 190 (1881); Freeland v. Charnley, 80
Ind. 132 (1881) ; Logsdon v. Newton, 54 Iowa 448, 6 N. W. 715 (1880) ;
Parker v. Parker, 1 Gray (67 Mhss.) 409 (1854); Comer v. Baldwin,
16 Minn. 172 (1870); Sursa v. Cash, 171 Mo. App. 396, 156 S. W. 779(1913); Weir v. Batdorf, 24 Neb. 83, 38 N. W. 22 (1888).
10. Gall v. Brashier, 169 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1948).
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is in all other respects unobjectionable, the circumstance of
who possesses it seems altogether irrelevant." That it serves
its purpose and provides evidence of those terms of the con-
tract contained in the writing is beyond dispute.' 2  On this
point the many jurisdictions, among them Indiana,13 which
require delivery occupy a logically indefensible position.
Careful scrutiny reveals, however, that courts requiring
delivery do not assume that the memorandum is unobjection-
able and then pass upon the delivery point as a matter of
logic. The assumption is instead that perhaps no contract
has been formed, or that the memorandum may not be suffi-
ciently expressive of its terms. It is probably the theory
of these courts that while the writing is undelivered, it can-
11. Arnett v. Wescott, 107 Kan. 693, 193 Pac. 377 (1920); Drury
v. Young. 58 Md. 546 (1882); Vinson v. Pugh, 173 N. C. 189, 91 S. E.
838 (1917); see also Note, 100 A. L. R. 196 (1934).
12. See Austin v. McCollum, 210 N. C. 817, 818, 188 S. E. 646, 647
(1936) ; Black v. Black, 185 Tenn. 23, 32, 202 S. W.2d 659, 663 (1947);
Radiophone Broadcasting Station v. Imboden, 183 Tenn. 215, 219, 191
S. W.2d 535, 537 (1946); Boston v. De Jarnette, 153 Va. 591, 600, 151
S. E. 146, 148 (1930); Chiles v. Bowyer, 127 Va. 249, 259, 103 S. E.
619, 622 (1920); Atkins v. Sayer, 95 W. Va. 403, 405, 121 S. E. 283,
284 (1924).
13. Authority on the necessity for delivery of the memorandum
is rather limited in Indiana, and there are no recent cases in point. In
all those cases where an undelivered deed was offered as a memor-
andum it was held ineffective. An early Indiana case held that "it
is unquestionably the law that a deed is destitute of force until de-
livered, and it can not be made available for any purpose." Freeland
v. Charnley, 80 Ind. 132, 134 (1881). Another case decided the same
year agreed in result and went on to state confusingly that "a paper
of any kind, although it contains all the terms of a contract, is not
operative as a contract until delivered with the intention of giving it
effect." Pulse v. Miller, 81 Ind. 190, 192 (1881). In 1910 the Indiana
Appellate Court in a dictum seemed to depart from the previous theory
by stating that a memorandum of an oral contract to convey land is
evidence of the contract only, and whether it remains in the hands of
one party or the other it fulfills the purpose of the statute and renders
the contract enforceable. See Ames v. Ames, 46 Ind. App. 597, 604, 91
N. E. 509, 512 (1910). It should be noted that in the Ames case it
was not an undelivered deed which was presented, but another writing
incapable of being a conveyance if delivered. In a 1919 case decided
in the main upon a finding that the plaintiff had taken unfair ad-
vantage of the defendant, the court again stated that an undelivered
writing of any kind could not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, thus
reverting to the position taken in the early cases. Harter v. Morris,
72 Ind. App. 189, 123 N. E. 23 (1919). Thus, Indiana authority is
rather conclusive that an undelivered deed or lease can not be effective
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and a similar result would probably
be reached where the writing is not a deed or lease, notwithstanding
the contrary dictum of the Ames case.
14. See Steel v. Fife, 48 Iowa 99, 101 (1878); Johnson v. Brooks,
31 Miss. 17, 19 (1856); Note, 20 TENN. L. REV. 201 (1948).
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not be assumed that there has been a final oral agreement,
and that the defendant should not be called upon to estab-
lish that no contract was formed. 15 It also seems to be
assumed that a writing while undelivered is unlikely to be
a full expression of whatever oral agreement was reached. 16
On these assumptions oral evidence would be necessary to
prove that the writing represents a completed contract and
that it is a full memorandum. It is arguable that this
calls for the use of the very oral evidence which the Statute
of Frauds seeks to eliminate as a precaution against perjury
and fraud.17  Courts adopting this view thus do not require
delivery for its own sake but simply to avoid the evidentiary
difficulties which lack of delivery seems to them to pose.
But it is doubtful that the rule of the Gall case, which
allows a party to prove by parol that there was a contract
and that the memorandum offered is a sufficient notation of
it, will defeat the purpose of the Statute of Frauds any more
than will the rule'8 which allows parol proof of the contents
of a memorandum which has been lost or destroyed, or the
rule' 9 that holds it non-essential that there have been intent
that the writing should constitute a memorandum. Further,
a requirement of delivery makes the Statute of Frauds pre-
scribe more than its framers intended.'0 While the fact of
delivery may be relevant evidence in arriving at answers to
the true questions, viz., the formation of the contract and
15. See cases cited note 8 supra.
16. See cases cited note 7 supra.
17. This assumption may very well be correct in cases where the
writing is an undelivered deed rather than some other instrument. A
deed in practice seldom contains the essential terms of an oral con-
tract to convey. For example, the consideration is often recited as one
dollar in the deed though the agreed figure is something very much
different.
18. Hiss v. Hiss, 228 Ill. 414, 81 N. E. 1056 (1907); J. A. B.
Holding Co. v. Nathan, 120 N. J. Eq. 340, 184 Atl. 829 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 216 (1932).
19. Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Ref. Co., 8 F.2d 601
(7th Cir. 1925); Morris Furniture Co. v. Braverman, 210 Iowa 946,
230 N. W. 356 (1930); Knobel v. Cortell-Markson Co., 122 Me. 511, 120
Atl. 721 (1923); Kahn v. Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 Atl. 359
(1925); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 209 (1932); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 579 (rev. ed. 1936).
20. It has been argued that the Statute of Frauds is in derogation
of the common law and thus is subject to the rule of strict construction:
"the requirement of delivery of the memorandum would be beyond its
terms, and for that reason beyond its spirit and purpose." Ely v.
Phillips, 89 W. Va. 580, 581, 109 S. E. 808, 809 (1921); Note, 11
BOSTON U. L. REV. 440 (1931).
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the sufficiency of the memorandum, there is neither logic nor




EQUITABLE DEVIATION IN INDIANA
The will of William E. English directed that certain
real property on Monument Circle in Indianapolis be placed
in charitable trust, and that the trustees erect a new building
thereon to serve as headquarters for charities of the city.
Sale of the property was expressly forbidden by the will.
The trustees, however, petitioned the Marion County Probate
Court for an order authorizing sale of the land. It was shown
that the existing structure had become too antiquated to be
used for the trust purpose; that an insufficiency in trust
assets-the result of changed conditions-had rendered im-
practicable the erection of a new building; and that sale of
the property would provide funds with which a building could
be erected elsewhere, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the
trust. These facts moved the court to apply the doctrine
of equitable deviation and order sale of the land. On appeal
the order was affirmed. Foust v. William E. English Founda-
tion, 80 N. E.2d 303 (Ind. App. 1948).
This decision, the first in Indiana to sanction the sale
of trust property despite the settlor's express prohibition,
was apparently' decided on the basis of equitable deviation,
21. The trend among the later cases seems to be toward the rule
that delivery is not required. Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania
have within the last quarter century subscribed to this view. Black v.
Black, 185 Tenn. 23, 202 S. W.2d 659 (1947); Radiophone Broadcasting
Station v. Imboden, 183 Tenn. 215, 191 S. W.2d 535 (1946); Boston v.
De Jarnette, 153 Va. 591, 151 S. E. 146 (1930); Chiles v. Bowyer, 127
Va. 249, 103 S. E. 619 (1920); Peoples Trust Co. v. Consumers Ice &
Coal Co., 283 Pa. 76, 128 Atl. 723 (1925); Allen v. Mowry, 278 Pa.
64, 122 Ati. 168 (1923).
1. The Appellate Court's grounds of decision are obscure. In the
Marion County Probate Court the parties had argued the applicability
of an Indiana statute which empowers circuit or superior courts to
authorize sales of trust property if one of the following is shown: the
trust real property is subject to waste or depreciation; taxes and costs
of repair exceed the income of the property; the sale of the property
would be advantageous to the beneficiaries and fulfill the trust pur-
poses. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 56-621. The decree of
the Marion County Probate Court evidently was based not on the
statute, but upon the court's "equitable powers in the administration
464 [Vol. 24
